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I. Introduction
Universal access to health care is an ideal goal for all nations. Nations 
often base their health care development plans on this principle. In 
Somalia, provision of health care services was also driven by this prin-
ciple, and delivery of services was publicly funded like other social 
services, such as education. However, that goal was never achieved 
and the health status indicators for Somalia, even before the collapse of 
the central government, showed grim statistics.1
Health care services in Somalia were shaped by various administra-
tions that adopted different policies, priorities, and health care service 
approaches, often influenced by local and international paradigms and 
resolutions. The parliamentary government in the 1960s and the mili-
tary government in the 1970s to 1990s shared common deficiencies in 
their national plans. Development plans were driven by institutional 
history, political interest, and personal desires, instead of need and 
resource capacities based on empirical evidence. Both administrations 
failed to maintain established health care delivery infrastructures or 
sustain their core operations, let alone expand services to the rural 
population and other vulnerable groups or modernize the system and 
improve its quality. As a result, health care facilities in many districts 
collapsed and were unable to provide even the minimum required 
clinical and preventive services.
In addition, high population growth, environmental degradation, 
desertification, frequent droughts and famines, urbanization and hap-
Mohamed Gedi Qayad
191
hazard settlement, poverty and a weak economy, and poor governance 
created an unbearable burden of health problems that overwhelmed 
the nation’s staggering health care system and its coping mechanisms. 
These problems stifled the health care system and contributed to the 
poor health status of the Somali people.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) never developed a core health care 
services package nor gauged the extent of resources and infrastructure 
needed to deliver them. It could have saved wasted resources and 
eased its management burden if sound leadership had been practiced. 
As a result of poor leadership, the needs of the health care system 
and its effective operation were misconceptualized. Furthermore, the 
type and competencies of health manpower for the provision of a core 
health care services package, at different levels of delivery points, were 
never determined. Development of a national health plan with such 
attributes could have traced an efficient and progressive path for the 
Somali health care system.
A prominent weakness of the Somali health care system was the 
lack of a strong regulatory body on drug importation and utilization. 
Disappointing outcomes of treatable diseases, such as tuberculosis, 
malaria, typhoid, and dysentery, were mainly attributed to the poor 
quality of imported drugs. As a result, many patients succumbed, in 
addition to those who fell victim to provider negligence and ignorance. 
The currently flourishing drugstores across the country could danger-
ously worsen an already dire health situation.
There were several milestones in the history of health care services 
in Somalia. In 1966, a nursing school was established in Hargeisa, and 
another one in Mogadishu in 1970. In 1973, a faculty of medicine and 
surgery was set up in Mogadishu. These training institutions boosted 
the human resources for health. The smallpox eradication campaign 
in the mid-1970s, and introduction to primary health care (PHC) and 
new tuberculosis (TB) treatment regimens by the Finnish Interna-
tional Development Agency (FINIDA) in the 1980s, brought in mas-
sive external assistance. It established PHC training institutions and 
opened the door for medical specialty training in TB and lung diseases. 
These inputs expanded access to health care services and improved the 
quality of care, particularly with regard to TB. However, the massive 
resources injected into the health care system were not used properly 
and their contributions faded soon. Another landmark was the forma-
tion of a semi-autonomous refugee health unit (RHU) in the Ministry 
of Health to serve the refugees from Ethiopia in 1977, which attracted 
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massive foreign aid and expatriate health professionals. The RHU 
introduced sound health care planning and effective operations, which 
positively influenced the overall MOH functions and operations. The 
RHU staff gained valuable experience and knowledge about public 
health concepts and practices. This produced competent public health 
professionals and raised the awareness and practice of public health 
in Somalia. Also in the 1980s, research in medical sciences was initi-
ated by the faculty of medicine, in collaboration with several universi-
ties in Sweden, through the National Academy of Science and Arts in 
Mogadishu. This was a new dawn for research in medical sciences and 
other fields in Somalia. This initiative and the others mentioned earlier 
mainly contributed to health manpower production and development. 
However, these gains were reversed by the economic downturn and 
political turmoil of the 1980s and civil war of the 1990s.
All in all, the health status indicators in Somalia remained at the 
bottom among the developing countries.2 Currently, in the absence of a 
central government, health care services have become a local initiative, 
and with mixed success. Therefore, to avoid misguided national health 
development plans and policy, it is essential to examine the deficien-
cies and gaps in the operation of the past health care systems, and 
to provide a basic framework to ensure a functional and sustainable 
health care system in the future.
II. Background
The Ministry of Health (MOH) in Somalia had six departments: plan-
ning and training, personnel, prevention services, curative services, 
finance and administration, and procurement and medical supplies 
(figure 1). In the mid-1980s a new structure was introduced (figure 2) 
but was later abandoned. The MOH practiced a centralized system 
for decision-making and had links to the 18 administrative regions 
through regional medical officers (RMO) that reported to the curative 
services department. However, the regional primary health care proj-
ect coordinators had semi-independent management from the RMO 
and worked under the directives and authority of the national PHC 
coordinator, who reported to the prevention services department. The 
MOH was responsible for the health care services of the civilian por-
tion of the nine million Somalis who were mostly rural inhabitants.
Information on access and utilization of the health care services is 
skimpy. It is often reported, however, that less than 30% of the popula-
Mohamed Gedi Qayad
193
tion has access to health care services, The most common illnesses are 
infectious diseases, related to poor personal hygiene and environmen-
tal sanitation, human behavior, chronic illnesses, and events related to 
lack of basic services, such as obstetric and preventive services.3 The 
MOH staffs clinics, hospitals, health posts, and vertical programs. It is 
involved in projects dealing with malaria, schistosomiasis, tuberculo-
sis, leprosy, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), PHC, and 
family planning, and attempted to provide needed services through-
out the country.
Due to the dissatisfaction of the consumers and health care provid-
ers with the quality of health care services and low remuneration, 
the government allowed private practice for medical doctors in the 
late 1980s. This raised the health care providers’ income and partially 
remedied their income problem. However, health care suffered further, 
indicating that the problem was wrongly conceived and the solution 
was not appropriate. The declining economy and rising inflation in the 
1980s, and the war against Ethiopia in the late 1970s, pushed the sys-
tem into almost complete collapse.
The vertical programs that had disease-specific objectives were 
funded almost entirely by international organizations and develop-
ment agencies, like WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, FINIDA, USAID, UNDP, 
Figure 1. Organogram of the Ministry of Health—Somalia
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SIDA, and the EU. Although WHO’s contribution was mainly tech-
nical, it funded a couple of PHC programs that were experimental, 
whereas some of the other agencies were involved in program devel-
opment, implementation, and evaluation. Despite such involvement, 
their contributions were not effective. For example, UNICEF was 
involved in the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) operations, 
in collaboration with the WHO, but the percentage of children under 
5 years old who are fully immunized is currently below 40%. Like-
wise, FINIDA funded the national TB control program for at least six 
regions, but no change on the disease burden has been observed. The 
current TB prevalence among asylum seekers screened at Heathrow 
Airport in London is 1,045 per 100,000 population, which is relatively 
high in spite of the continued FINIDA funding until early 1990, when 
the central government collapsed.4
III. Demographic and Health Profiles
A precise count of the Somali population is hard to find. Local and 
international organizations use estimated figures to plan their humani-
tarian and service operations. Currently, the population estimates 
quoted by these organizations range from seven to ten million, with 
crude birth and death rates of 46 and 18 per 1,000 population, respec-
tively, and an annual growth rate of 2.8% with a dependency ratio of 
101%.5 The total fertility rate is 7.3 babies per woman of reproductive 
age, underlining the importance of obstetric services and the risk of 
maternal deaths. The life expectancy at birth is 46 years for males and 
49 years for females. High mortality rates in the early stages of life are 
responsible for this poor life expectancy at birth. The infant and under-
5 mortality rate estimates in 2000 were 130 per 1,000 live births and 224 
per 1,000 live births, respectively. These rates have not changed much 
since 1970, despite a functioning government in Somalia. During the 
civil war, disasters exacerbated these rates substantially and the overall 
crude mortality rates surpassed those recorded in Ethiopia and Sudan 
during the famine in 1984–85.6 Maternal mortality ratios, an indica-
tor of poor access to basic obstetric services, is estimated at 1,600 per 
100,000 live births.
The majority of the population (59%) practices a nomadic lifestyle 
with no access to health care or other social services.7 They are at great 
risk for malnutrition and disease, although the extent of their suffering 
is not often documented. From 1950 to 2002, the population in Somalia 
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almost tripled. Currently, around 45% is under 15 years of age and 3% 
is 65 years and over. Conversely, the basic social services have been 
declining or remained stagnant.
IV. Health Care Resources
The health problems causing outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and 
calls to traditional healers do not differ from those in the neighboring 
countries, with the exception of HIV/AIDS and a few country-specific 
diseases.8 Provision of preventive and curative services at the indi-
vidual and population levels needs to focus on these issues, and ensure 
adequate resources and the establishment of essential infrastructures 
to deliver the services.
In Somalia currently, there are 196 MCH clinics and outpatient dis-
pensaries, and 520 health posts that provide preventive and outpatient 
curative services, mostly to urban dwellers. Prior to the demise of the 
central government, their utilization was limited to those who could 
afford to pay necessary enabling services. The rural population and 
urban poor were quite neglected and few facilities were accessible to 
them.
In addition, there are 74 hospitals with 3,405 beds that often provide 
curative and preventive services to inpatients and clients attending 
hospital-affiliated outpatient clinics. These hospitals cluster in urban 
centers like Mogadishu and regional capitals. For many in rural dis-
trict towns limited services are available, which makes their utilization 
quasi-irrelevant to the population needs, although there are variations 
in their capacities. A significant portion of these facilities were disabled 
by the civil war and continuing disorder.
Diagnostic facilities that are essential to patient care are limited. In 
2005, 114 clinical laboratories existed in the country. Statistics on X-ray 
machines are not available, but every hospital was equipped with at 
least one, besides those in TB hospitals. Some machines at district hos-
pitals are dysfunctional at the moment. Thus, total X-ray machines in 
the country must number fewer than 74, although some of those that 
had been out of order may have been replaced.
Information on some of the health care resources, which include 
manpower, medical supplies, drugs, and funds, is also limited. In 1973, 
when the medical school was established, there were 96 physicians, 
of whom the majority was expatriates. In 1978, the number of physi-
cians increased to 196. In 2004, there were only 240 physicians and 
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358 nurses in the country, despite the continuous production of physi-
cians and nurses by the medical school and nursing schools till 1990.9 
This indicates how the civil war wiped out the gains in health man-
power production and development. It is estimated that more than 330 
physicians and close to 500 nurses disappeared during the civil war. 
Currently, the doctor/population ratio and the nurse/population ratio 
estimates are one doctor per 31,000 people and one nurse per 20,000 
people, indicating severe inadequacy of services.
The national budget ($1.2 billion per annum before the decomposi-
tion) that was allocated to the MOH was around 2% ($24 million), and 
it remained constant over the years. The World Bank estimated $12 per 
person per annum to cover the cost of basic public health and cura-
tive services in low-income countries.10 In Somalia, with an estimated 
population of approximately eight million, this amounts to $96 million, 
which is four times higher than the 2% of the national budget allocated 
to the MOH. In addition, external funding was often injected into the 
vertical programs, with little substantive impact. Programs receiving 
such funds often disappeared after the donor support ceased.
The nation’s policies, which were never based on precise facts and 
figures, failed to provide clear guidance to the frontline decision-mak-
ers about the overall health care mission and the driving principles of 
health care service delivery. However, the campaign against female 
genital mutilation was given high priority and was one of the posi-
tive policies for the nation before 1991. The MOH also endorsed the 
PHC approach as the principle and guidance for the delivery of health 
care services. Although it was a positive political decision, the MOH 
was not aware of the requirements of its implementation. The deci-
sion was internationally driven, and compliance with the international 
community was guaranteed without an in-depth understanding of the 
nuances of the Alma-Ata communiqué, which is common in interna-
tional resolutions.11
V. Health System Problems
In Somalia, as is the case with the least developing countries, the health 
and development indicators hardly experienced any improvement. 
The illnesses that were common early in the 1960s, after independence, 
have remained prevalent till today, despite progress in some social 
service sectors in the early 1970s. This illustrates that the country’s 
health care system was incapable of satisfactorily providing curative 
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and preventive services. Although in Somalia defects responsible for 
the poor health status indicators were never fully examined, several 
factors have often been cited for the developing world, particularly for 
African countries south of the Sahara.12 These include:
1.  Inadequate funds for health service operations
2.  Inadequate resources for patient care and public health services
3.  Maldistribution of available resources and mismatch of scarce 
resources to priority health problems
4.  Poor management of resources
5.  Poor stewardship and lack of accountability
6.  Poor health development planning, resulting in misguided priori-
ties and unclear or unachievable objectives
7.  Corruption and manpower dissatisfaction
8.  Poor quality of available health care services
9.  Lack of clear understanding of the mission and objectives of the 
MOH by the frontline health care workers
Some of these factors are interdependent and influenced by the nation’s 
overall development plan and policy, but many fall within the MOH 
responsibilities that are amenable to corrective measures. The latter 
include quality assurance and improvement of the health care services, 
health manpower development, adoption of sound management and 
accountability practices, and establishment of strong regulatory poli-
cies and practices. The severe drought in the 1970s, the 1977–78 war 
with Ethiopia, and the economic downturn in the 1980s all had a major 
impact on the national health development plan and health care ser-
vices. As a result, both patient care and public health services suffered.
There were missed opportunities to establish a solid health care sys-
tem and expand into the rural areas where a large part of the popula-
tion lives. The introduction of PHC and external funds given to the TB 
control programs by FINIDA were excellent opportunities to extend 
health system infrastructures and adopt clear policies for its opera-
tions and sustenance. Instead, the PHC, which required changes in 
policy and organization of the entire health care system, was initiated 
as a vertical program running parallel with the established health care 
system in some regions. It was wrongly viewed as a project rather than 
an approach based on principles of decentralization, community par-
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ticipation, inter-sectoral collaboration, rational allocation of resources, 
and the comprehensive implementation of all elements of PHC.
Weak infrastructures also hampered access to and utilization of 
functioning health care facilities. Consequently, health care services 
catered to the urban population and barely reached the rural inhabit-
ants or the urban poor.
VI. Major Challenges and Recommendations
The first and foremost challenge to the development of a sound health 
care plan is a lack of strategic information and data on the health care 
system and its operations, and information on other related sectors. 
Most of the health service facilities record basic client information but 
these were never analyzed or utilized. The MOH mandated several 
diseases to be reported to its national surveillance office. Such infor-
mation was occasionally tabulated and sent to the central office in 
Mogadishu by the regional MOH authorities. However, the data was 
haphazardly collected and had little use for effective planning and 
operational decisions.
In addition, the capacity to gather, analyze and disseminate surveil-
lance data and other information was not developed well. The MOH 
lacked necessary infrastructure and equipment as well as skilled man-
power that could use such information for strategic planning and pol-
icy development. Some donor nations provided scholarships to MOH 
personnel for public health training, and the faculty of Medicine of 
the Somali National University started postgraduate training in pub-
lic health in the early 1980s. However, most of those who completed 
their training either joined international organizations or sought better 
opportunities in the oil-rich Arabian countries in the Gulf. Thus, a mas-
sive brain drain in the 1980s hampered any planned progress in this 
area.
International paradigms and resolutions have both positive and neg-
ative influences on the health care plans in developing countries, and 
Somalia is no exception. In the 1980s, health for all by the year 2000, 
through the PHC approach, dominated the health sector and national 
policies in the developing countries. Currently, the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, Kyoto Protocol, health sector reform, poverty reduction, 
G-8 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (G8/NEPAD), global-
ization, and other initiatives all shape the way in which developing 
countries operate, set policies, and receive funding from international 
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organizations and donor countries.13 These paradigms and resolutions 
place an unnecessary burden on developing countries, particularly 
on the strategic planning and policy developments. Poor countries 
are obliged to satisfy donor requirements based on these resolutions 
before addressing their national priorities. The donors thus exert a 
stronger influence than what the loans or donations deserve. Therefore, 
development funds should not be expected to make tangible changes 
in health status indicators.
Financing health care operations will remain a major challenge for 
Somalia due to the growing health needs as well as the absence of a 
central government responsible for social services. The nation’s eco-
nomic capacity, as in the past, cannot finance the health care needs 
adequately. Private health care services, which predominate in the 
country, may create the foundation for a sustainable health care sys-
tem in the future. This could lead to the development of a rational 
health care plan that capitalizes on the strength of public and private 
health care services, and fits into the economic realities of the nation. 
This amalgam might maintain the safety-net attribute of the publicly 
funded system, support the quality of health care services that accom-
panies the private ownership, and provide incentives for growth and 
development in the system.
The high fertility rates and resultant population growth increase 
the burden of diseases and the need for health care, in addition to the 
low capacity of MOH to provide health care services. The imbalance 
between services and needs was always a major challenge and will 
continue to be unabated into the future. This situation is very com-
mon in low-income countries and deserves proper attention in the 
national planning process to allocate adequate services proportional 
to the magnitude and type of problems. Here, continuous monitor-
ing and determination to insert health concerns into any development 
plan is indispensable.
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is an urgent challenge in health care and 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, where two-thirds of the world’s 
HIV/AIDS victims live (although they constitute only 10% of the 
world’s population). The socio-economic impact in high HIV/AIDS 
incidence countries is staggering. Although the HIV/AIDS prevalence 
in Somalia is around 1%, according to the WHO sero-prevalence sur-
vey in 2004, the factors that could propel the epidemic are not uncom-
mon.14 Therefore, the HIV/AIDS impact observed in high prevalence 
countries may not spare Somalia.
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The cost of medical and social services for people living with HIV/
AIDS is beyond the budget of the ministries of health in most of Sub-
Saharan Africa, according to a study in Haiti.15 In Somalia, the annual 
cost of services, for example, for one-third of the HIV/AIDS cases 
amounts to approximately $42 million. This shows how the epidemic 
could be economically devastating even in low prevalence countries.
The impact of HIV/AIDS affects all aspects of human life, such 
as livelihood, education, family, agriculture, and security. Therefore, 
solving the problems in these sectors and combating the spread of 
the disease require global resource mobilization and collaboration to 
muster adequate resources. Focusing only on the consequences of the 
disease will be fruitless and self-defeating. The main cost-effective tool 
at this time, for Somalia and other developing countries, is investing in 
prevention activities.
As disasters increase, mental health problems increase as well. Men-
tal health was neglected before, and currently the need is vast and criti-
cal. This will be a growing challenge that any future government must 
address in terms of resources and access to adequate mental health 
attention. Few health care professionals are trained in this field. The 
establishment of a mental health institute for training professionals is 
badly needed. Oral health care faces a similar situation. It is a forgotten 
service although almost every individual in the country needs dental 
services. The proposed mental health institute could be coupled with 
an oral health institute. These two areas will fill a void in the Somali 
post-independence health care system.
To ensure adequate and equitable quality health care services for the 
population, concrete information is needed to develop a proper health 
care development plan. Such information provides policymakers with 
the means and abilities to identify the health care needs, prioritize, 
determine the basic health care service package for the people, and 
develop sustainable approaches for service delivery.
A strategic planning approach is often prescribed for countries with 
limited resources, like Somalia, to ensure efficiency in the delivery 
of health care services. Many countries have used this approach in 
their health sector reform endeavors.16 Other approaches were also 
employed to make the system operational and sustainable, such as 
health sector reform, cost sharing, improving the quality of services, 
and decentralization of management and decision-making.
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The future health care development plan, based on the framework 
in Figure 3, should address adequately the core functions of the health 
care system, namely:
•  Financing
•  Resource generation
•  Service delivery
•  Stewardship oversight
Figure 3. Health Care Service Framework
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The financing of health care involves the budget allocated to the 
MOH from the national ministerial budget, which is part of the 
national development plan and its sources. Without adequate funds 
for basic health care services and overall operations, the health status 
of the population cannot be improved. Earlier MOH budgets were not 
adequate and the government’s income was incapable of sufficient 
allocation of funds to the MOH. Therefore, health care services should 
be able to contribute some capital while maintaining the safety net for 
the poor, the majority of the population. The health care system will 
gradually move to partial privatization as the economic well-being 
of the society improves and consumers become capable of paying for 
their basic services.
This necessitates establishing assets that generate income in order 
for the local health care system to maintain basic quality services and 
have the versatility to accommodate increasing service needs brought 
on by population growth, disasters, and epidemics. The resources gen-
erated by these assets should be sustainable, managed properly, and 
invested to expand revenues. Funds from the central and local govern-
ment could cover the basic health care services.
Resource generation mainly encompasses human resources, drugs, 
and medical supplies. The MOH should establish manpower develop-
ment institutions and collaborate with other training institutions, such 
as universities, colleges, and institutes. This increases the production 
of skilled manpower that can improve the quality of clinical and pre-
ventive services, assess the health needs of the population, monitor 
and evaluate the performance of the health care system, and contribute 
to better development of the national health care plan.
Self-sufficiency in essential drug supplies can only be achieved 
through local production. Therefore, the government should develop 
long-term goals and establish drug industries for local production. 
In the meantime, the quantity and quality of drugs imported and uti-
lized should follow clearly defined regulatory policies developed by 
informed professionals capable of gauging international rules and 
regulations governing drug marketing. These drugs should be appro-
priate to the common health problems of the society. The government 
should also plan to invest in researching medicinal plants to search out 
raw materials for local production.
The delivery of health care services needs to be decentralized. The 
main entry point for health care services should be at the district level. 
District authorities, in collaboration with community leaders and 
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members, will carry out management and other decisions on health 
care issues locally. The regional and national authorities must have 
supervisory, support and accountability roles. Funds allocated by the 
central authorities should be transferred directly to the districts with-
out intermediate bureaucratic red tape. The disbursement of funds to 
the districts should follow a formula that takes into account the popu-
lation size, burden of diseases and other health care problems, avail-
ability of infrastructures, local resources and number of hospital beds, 
size and categories of health personnel, and other relevant issues.
At the district level, people will receive basic health care services. 
Such services should be based on priority health problems determined 
through concrete population needs assessments and determination of 
standard service packages and appropriate capacities for the provid-
ers at specific facilities. This includes curative and preventive services 
for the majority of the population, and basic obstetric and reproduc-
tive health services for women. Essential infrastructures that support 
such services must be developed and sustained by the local authorities 
and communities in collaboration with the regional and central gov-
ernments and international agencies. The local district governments 
should participate in funding the health care services and contribute to 
an agreed upon portion of district revenues. All external funding from 
international organizations should be time-delimited to avoid creating 
dependency and negative impacts on the local health care plan and 
policies upon its cessation.
The MOH must develop a strong hierarchical referral system and 
enabling mechanisms to guarantee communication and transportation 
of patients from one level to the next. It should also develop standard 
services as well as personnel and their capacity to ensure good quality. 
Adequate and proper resources should be allocated to these facilities 
to ensure continuity, sustainability, and quality. Such resources should 
be shared by the districts and regions that benefit (on top of the funds 
allocated by the central government).
The proposed approach for the health care delivery system cannot 
function without good stewardship, which oversees the nation’s health 
system and coordinates local resources and donor contributions. Good 
stewardship sets the vision, direction, and policies that ensure the pro-
vision of a basic health care service package to the population. This 
should be fed by valid information, collected and synthesized continu-
ously and strategically.
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The MOH needs to establish an autonomous unit that is responsible 
for assessment, monitoring, evaluation, policy analysis, health system 
research, and coordination of resources, that feeds strategic informa-
tion to the decision-makers at all levels. This enables rational allocation 
and utilization of resources and taking timely actions to redress any 
shortcomings in the system and avoid derailment from the national 
goals and objectives.
Certain health problems (such as tuberculosis, malaria, EPI, schisto-
somiasis, leprosy, anthropozoontic diseases like brucellosis, viral hem-
orrhagic diseases, etc.) that are endemic in particular localities or have 
wide distribution can be managed better through vertical programs. 
This should, however, come under the district health management, 
while allowing flexibility in its operations to collaborate with regional 
and national authorities and international agencies. This facilitates 
support from external donor governments and agencies.
Establishment of functional and sustainable health care systems takes 
many forms and approaches.17 Some of these forms and approaches 
have merits to be pursued further for the strengthening and reorgani-
zation of the health care system, but others may not address the press-
ing issues in Somalia. Many proposed reforms and interventions were 
confined to localities and their effectiveness, when applied to wider 
administrative areas, couldn’t be replicated.18
In addition, health sector reform strategies have been developed and 
proposed by non-native experts on the developing world. Although 
some of these experts produce technically and scientifically sound 
guidelines, a lack of cultural and local competence to fully under-
stand the system problems has been a source of ultimate failure. More-
over, these experts control the mechanisms for financing the proposed 
reforms and rarely accommodate legitimate concerns from locals if it 
conflicts with their philosophy and paradigm. Therefore, the locals 
sacrifice their priorities at the expense of receiving external funds that 
may benefit them and the system only temporarily.
The WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) sup-
ported the Basic Development Needs (BDN) approach to improve 
the quality of life, cognizant of the relationship between poverty and 
heath.19 The BDN was first introduced into the region in the late 1980s. 
It was used experimentally in some villages in Somalia. However, the 
BDN addresses areas beyond the domain of the MOH. Its realization 
entails national policy change and the reorientation of ministerial oper-
ations into social development, community empowerment, and equity 
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of social services. The BDN approach is similar to that of the PHC, but 
incorporates experiences gained from the PHC programs, which lead 
to adjustment of the shortcomings of the PHC approach. It encounters, 
however, similar challenges experienced by the PHC (i.e., inter-sectoral 
collaboration, policy issues, external resources, and donor policies).
The BDN has some advantages. It reverses the centralized system of 
health care planning and policy development, and empowers the com-
munity to determine its own health care needs. It also introduces the 
concept of community development into the local communities and 
raises their political standing, awareness, and responsibilities, which 
could have a lasting legacy for better governance and local develop-
ment approaches. In the case of Somalia, the BDN was operating under 
the MOH, which did not change its practices or policies to satisfy the 
needs of its implementation. It is noteworthy that the calls for reform 
and changes did not emerge from the local authority that faces these 
problems daily. Therefore, their implementation will be undermined 
by the absence of an appropriate conceptualization.
Health care systems in the developing world, particularly Africa, 
need the technical and financial support of international and U.N. 
organizations, and donor countries. However, the current vicious cycle 
of dependency on external aid must not continue. It benefits neither 
the systems nor the donors. A new partnership mechanism that guar-
antees constructive contribution of funds to the health care system 
should be developed. Such partnership should also place a high prior-
ity on sustainable contributions to the system, even though it demands 
solid commitment and a change of culture in operations from both the 
donor and recipient countries.
Non-governmental organizations and U.N. agencies must adopt a 
system of genuine accountability, appraised by independent groups 
that represent all stakeholders. The findings and recommendations 
of such appraisals must be binding and translated into actions that 
will be subsequently monitored and evaluated. This enables early 
detection and adjustment of derailments from the set course of action. 
Such checks and balances bring credibility into the system and affirm 
the realization of the mission and goals commissioned by the United 
Nations and other international organizations.
Recipient countries should also lay out transparent policy guidelines 
on spending and coordination of external aid. This should be piloted 
in a few districts first, before massive resources are wasted if it fails. 
This assumes a nurturing and mature political climate wherein both 
Mohamed Gedi Qayad
207
the recipient and the donor share a common philosophy and clearly 
state their intentions and concerns for the well-being of the population. 
Such a practice can only take root and flourish in a democratic and 
law-abiding context.
IX. Conclusion
Somalia’s health care system has suffered from inadequate funding, 
mismanagement, and poor planning and policy development ever 
since independence. As a result, the people’s health suffered. Cur-
rently, the health care system is obviously in crisis from the protracted 
civil war of more than a decade. The population has been growing 
annually at a rate of 2.8%, although it experienced high mortality rates 
during the civil war in the early 1990s. The health care needs were 
increasing while resources and enabling infrastructures were dimin-
ishing or ceased to function.
The health status indicators rarely experienced any significant 
improvements. Many factors were attributed to this desperate situa-
tion:
•  Haphazard planning and policy development
•  Overwhelming health problems
•  Inadequate and maldistribution of resources
•  Corrupted management and absence of strong regulatory policies 
and fair practices
•  Poor governance
•  Underdevelopment
•  Poverty
•  Social inequities
•  Continuous natural and man-made disasters
The health care system experienced several milestones that brought 
opportunities to strengthen the system and improve the health sta-
tus of the population. However, these opportunities were wasted and 
many insurmountable challenges paralyzed the health care system. 
The current HIV/AIDS epidemic could exacerbate these challenges.
Therefore, provision of health care services should address and 
redress the critical challenges and ensure access to basic health care 
services to the majority of the population, while giving high priority to 
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vulnerable groups. This entails sound planning and policies from the 
government, based on rational judgment and empirical evidence, as 
well as contributions from the consumers and community through cost 
sharing and resource mobilization. The health care system should also 
adopt innovative financing mechanisms, decentralization of resources 
and decisions, and sound management and strong stewardship from 
the central government through continuous support, guidance, and 
monitoring and evaluation of health care system performances.
In Somalia, now under foreign military occupation and a new phase 
of bloody civil strife, the health concerns of the population may have 
to wait until the invading Ethiopian forces leave and a new legitimate 
order is born. In short, to get back to the great challenges of public 
health, it seems that Somalia will have to get the politics right first.
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